While China built, Germany closed. What does that mean for electricity and industry?

SVET ZA 5 MINÚT · approximately 7–8 minutes to read Published 18 October 2026 · generation: 1993–2025; trade and prices: 2025

Two major economies have taken opposite paths on nuclear power. Over three decades, China's nuclear electricity generation surged. Germany's fell to zero. Yet the country that shut down its own nuclear plants still imports electricity, including an estimated nuclear component.

The contrast is striking. Add Europe's higher industrial electricity prices, and a simple conclusion becomes tempting: closing nuclear plants caused the problem. These figures alone, however, do not establish that entire story. They show decisions and outcomes; measuring the precise consequences requires more than two curves.

What changed over three decades?

Annual nuclear electricity generation	China	Germany
1993	1.6 TWh	153.3 TWh
2024	450.9 TWh	0 TWh
2025	487.6 TWh	0 TWh

Source: Our World in Data's current energy dataset; rounded to one decimal place. 1

One terawatt-hour is one billion kilowatt-hours. The table therefore describes substantial amounts of electricity actually generated. It does not show reactor numbers or installed capacity. Capacity describes how much a facility can supply at a given moment; generation measures how much it delivered over a period.

China's growth also looks particularly dramatic because it starts from a very low base. Germany already had an established nuclear industry at the beginning of our chart. This is a comparison of different trajectories, not a contest between countries with identical starting conditions.

Why did Germany leave nuclear power behind?

Following the Fukushima accident in 2011, Germany accelerated its nuclear phase-out. Its final three plants—Emsland, Isar 2 and Neckarwestheim 2—stopped generating on 15 April 2023. That decision concerned domestic nuclear generation, not withdrawal from the European electricity grid. 2

The declining nuclear curve does not mean Germany stopped investing in energy. It developed other sources, including wind and solar. Our opening line, “China built, Germany closed,” refers specifically to nuclear power plants, not to all energy investment.

A useful question is what would have happened if some reactors had remained operational. They could have displaced some other generation or imports. Exactly how much, at what cost and with what effect on prices would depend on availability, fuel, maintenance and conditions across the wider system. Our chart does not calculate that alternative scenario.

China is not “powered entirely by nuclear”

Almost 488 TWh sounds enormous. But in China's enormous electricity system, nuclear accounted for approximately 4.6% of generation in 2025. Coal supplied about 54.3%, while renewables together contributed approximately 37.0%. These figures also come from the OWID dataset used for the chart. 1

That context matters. China is building nuclear power plants, but its electricity is not cheaper simply because it “makes everything with nuclear.” Reducing China's energy system to a nuclear success story would be as misleading as interpreting Germany's zero on our nuclear chart as zero electricity generation overall.

Absolute generation tells us how much electricity a source produces. Its percentage share tells us how important it is within a country's system. Understanding the system requires both.

Net imports: an important number, not a diagnosis of collapse

SMARD reports Germany's 2025 commercial electricity trade as 76.2 TWh of imports and 54.3 TWh of exports, leaving net imports of 21.9 TWh. Nuclear represented an estimated 22% of the overall import mix. The mix estimate and trade totals use different methodologies. 3

We therefore cannot say that “22% of those 21.9 TWh was nuclear.” The first figure is imports minus exports. The second describes an estimate of the generation sources behind imported electricity. Nor is it nuclear power's share of all German electricity consumption.

Importing does not necessarily indicate a shortage of power plants. Imagine an hour when electricity available abroad costs less than running a more expensive domestic generator. Buying it can make economic sense. In another hour, conditions reverse and electricity flows the other way.

The risk increases when several countries depend on imports simultaneously and their neighbours lack sufficient available generation or transmission capacity. Assessing supply security therefore requires looking at hourly conditions, not just annual totals. Connected markets can make more efficient use of resources, but the connections have physical limits. 4

What about Czechia, Slovakia and Austria?

For 2025, SMARD reports German imports from Czechia of 2.7 TWh and exports to Czechia of 6.9 TWh. 3 “Germany buys electricity from Czechia” and “Czechia bought more from Germany in this bilateral relationship” can both be true.

A country with an overall export surplus does not have to be a net exporter to every neighbour. Nor can all electricity crossing the Czech border automatically be labelled Czech nuclear generation. Physical flows, commercial exchanges and contractually documented electricity origins are different things.

Austria's regulator, for example, reports a net physical flow from Czechia to Austria of approximately 5.76 TWh in 2024. Across all its neighbours, Austria nevertheless exported more electricity than it imported that year. The flow alone does not establish its nuclear share. 5

For Czech and Slovak consumers, the important implication is that domestically generated electricity is not priced in isolation. Neighbouring markets influence each other where the network can connect them. This does not mean Europe has one identical electricity price or that households receive identical final bills.

Why cheap generation does not automatically mean a cheap bill

Consider a simplified example. Demand is 100 MWh. Cheaper generators can supply 90 MWh, while a more expensive generator must provide the final ten. Under the uniform-price model commonly used in coupled day-ahead markets, the last necessary offer can determine the clearing price. The result is therefore not a simple average of all power plants' production costs. This illustrates the principle; it is not a simulation of a particular trading hour. 6

The customer's final price also includes other charges and depends on the contract. Tomorrow's exchange price, a factory's multiyear electricity contract and a household bill including network charges and taxes are different things.

This is why the claim “we have nuclear, so our electricity must be cheap” needs care. A particular generator's production costs and the price paid by the customer are not the same quantity.

European industry faces a price disadvantage

The IEA estimates that electricity for energy-intensive industry in the EU cost approximately 50% more than in China in 2025. Its European comparison covers large consumers above 150 GWh annually and compensation under the IEA's methodology; it does not represent every business or household. 7

Our reel therefore uses an index: China = 100 and EU ≈ 150. Those numbers are not euros per MWh.

What could a price gap mean in practice? Consider a hypothetical factory consuming 150 GWh annually, or 150,000 MWh. A difference of just €20 per MWh would add €3 million to its yearly bill. This is our own illustrative calculation, not a real factory's bill or a conversion of the IEA estimate.

A company might pass some of the extra cost into product prices, accept a smaller margin, invest in efficiency or reconsider expansion. Relocation is another possibility, not an automatic outcome. Workers, transport, customers, tariffs, suppliers and investment costs also influence the decision. Our chart cannot establish that a particular steelworks or glass factory moved to China specifically because of electricity prices.

So is more nuclear the answer?

Nuclear can supply large amounts of low-emissions electricity without depending directly on the sunshine or wind available at that moment. New projects, however, require substantial capital, time and management of construction risks. The IEA highlights financing, delays and budget overruns among the challenges. 8

Extending the life of an existing plant and building an entirely new one are therefore different economic decisions. Safety, fuel, waste and eventual decommissioning must also be considered alongside today's generation costs.

The useful question is not which single source will solve everything. It is which combination of generation, networks, flexibility and financing can provide reliable electricity at an affordable cost. Energy decisions last for decades, but their costs feed into everyday production. They deserve more than a slogan—even if the striking contrast between China and Germany is what starts the discussion.

Methodology and sources

The chart contains 33 annual observations for each country. It uses OWID's `nuclear_electricity_twh` indicator; movement between annual points is animated in the video. The trade balance, import-mix estimate and industrial prices come from separate sources and do not constitute a causal model. The reactor and foundry illustrations do not depict identified facilities. Data may be revised.