The raw materials that make us dependent on China
Twelve raw materials and material groups connecting our factories, energy systems and electronics to China.
Svet za 5 minút · approximately 6 minutes to read · updated 10 October 2026
A factory can be in Slovakia, its machinery German and its customers European. Yet decisions made thousands of kilometres away can determine whether it has the materials to keep running.
Stopping production does not always require cutting off steel or electricity. A missing magnet, specialist semiconductor or cutting-tool material may be enough. Without it, the product simply cannot be finished. China holds an exceptionally strong position in several of these essential inputs.
What does dependence on China actually mean?
Three different questions matter: where a material is mined, where it is processed and who owns the businesses along the supply chain. An African deposit may belong to a company with a Chinese majority owner. Australian ore may pass through Chinese processing before reaching a European battery factory.
The percentages below describe shares of global output at a particular stage. They are not the Chinese import share of Slovak, Czech or European consumption. Dependence can also be indirect: a European component supplier may itself need Chinese materials.
12 materials worth knowing
1. Gallium — a small metal with a big electronics role
Uses: specialist semiconductors, power electronics, telecommunications equipment and LEDs. Gallium compounds help enable efficient electricity conversion in compact chargers, for example.
China connection: USGS estimates that China supplied 99% of global primary low-purity gallium production in 2025. This is an input for further purification and manufacturing, not a claim that China produces 99% of all chips. 1
2. Natural graphite — batteries and high-temperature industry
Uses: lithium-ion battery anodes, refractory materials for metallurgy, lubricants and other industrial products.
China connection: approximately 82% of global natural graphite mine production in 2025. Purification and further processing also matter for batteries. Synthetic graphite is used too, but is not included in this mining share. 2
3. Tungsten — the material used to make other products
Uses: exceptionally hard cutting and drilling tools, particularly cemented carbides. These serve engineering companies, mining operations and the oil and gas industry.
China connection: around 79% of global mine production in 2025. A disruption could therefore affect products containing no tungsten at all: manufacturers may need it in the tools used to machine their parts. 3
4. Magnet rare earths — motors and wind turbines
Uses: neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium are used in powerful permanent magnets for electric motors, industrial drives and some wind turbine designs.
China connection: the IEA puts China's share of global magnet rare-earth refining above 90%. Separating individual elements and manufacturing magnets are important stages too. Different motor and turbine designs do not all use the same technology. 4
5. Cobalt — Congolese mining, Chinese businesses
Uses: certain battery cathodes and heat-resistant alloys, including those used in aircraft engine turbines. LFP batteries do not need cobalt.
China connection: the Democratic Republic of the Congo supplied approximately 73% of global mine production in 2025, while China leads refining. China's CMOC owns 80% of TFM and 71.25% of KFM in the DRC. These are specific business interests, not evidence that China controls the entire country. 456
6. Lithium — storing energy matters too
Uses: rechargeable batteries for electronics, transport and stationary electricity storage, as well as glass and ceramics.
China connection: its strength lies particularly in processing lithium into chemicals needed for batteries. Mining also takes place in countries including Australia, Chile and Argentina. Opening another mine therefore does not, by itself, create a supply chain independent of China. 47
7. Silicon — from foundries to solar panels
Uses: ferrosilicon in metallurgy, and silicon metal in aluminium alloys and silicones. Further purification produces material suitable for solar cells and semiconductors.
China connection: almost 80% of global silicon materials production in 2025, measured by silicon content. This total covers different materials; it does not describe China's share of the world's most advanced chip manufacturing. 8
8. Magnesium — lighter parts and steel production
Uses: lightweight castings, aluminium alloys for transport and packaging, and sulphur removal in iron and steel production.
China connection: a dominant position in primary magnesium metal production. The metal must be distinguished from magnesium compounds. A shortage can affect downstream alloys and metal components, extending beyond products explicitly described as magnesium products. 9
9. Germanium — optical networks and infrared vision
Uses: optical fibres, infrared optics, certain semiconductors and multijunction solar cells for space applications.
China connection: USGS identifies China as the leading producer and exporter of germanium metal in 2025. Reliable global refining data are limited. Rather than assigning an eye-catching percentage, it is more accurate to identify the leading supplier and the applications exposed to disruption. 10
10. Indium — the almost invisible layer on a display
Uses: transparent conductive coatings on displays, specialist semiconductors, solders and optical communications. Indium tin oxide, or ITO, is a major application.
China connection: approximately 70% of global production, according to USGS 2026. Here, raw-material dependence can be hidden in a thin functional layer that a user barely notices on the finished product. 11
11. Manganese — steel and battery chemistry
Uses: steelmaking and certain battery cathodes. Steel and batteries require different forms and grades of material.
China connection: an exceptionally strong position in high-purity processing for battery supply chains. Other countries, including South Africa and Gabon, lead manganese ore mining. Dependence in battery chemicals should therefore not be confused with dependence across all manganese ore supply. 412
12. Fluorspar — a hidden chemical-industry input
Uses: feedstock for hydrofluoric acid, refrigerants and fluoropolymers. Related chemicals also support aluminium processing and semiconductor cleaning and etching.
China connection: the world's largest fluorspar mining producer. Its significance stretches from cooling and materials chemistry to electronics manufacturing, far beyond batteries and cars alone. 13
What if China starts cutting us off?
A complete embargo is not necessary. Slow export approvals, restrictions on a particular material grade or disruption at a single qualified supplier can cause problems.
Once inventories run out, the result may be more than a higher price. If a company cannot secure an approved replacement in time, a missing component can stop an entire production line. Deliveries of machinery, electronics and energy equipment may then be delayed.
This is not purely hypothetical. According to the IEA, Chinese rare-earth export controls introduced in April 2025 forced some automakers to reduce output or temporarily halt operations. The damage depends on inventories, alternatives and the specific restrictions; it does not mean that Europe's entire economy automatically comes to a stop. 14
Can this dependence be reduced?
Yes, but opening mines is not enough. Processing facilities, technology, skilled workers and component manufacturing are needed too. Recycling, appropriate inventories and genuinely independent suppliers can help. Buying from two traders linked to the same refinery offers limited protection.
For Slovakia and Czechia, the practical question is simple: do industrial businesses understand where their materials come from, several stages upstream of their direct suppliers? That is where a hidden vulnerability may sit.
The factory may be at home. The ability to keep it supplied has to be secured across the entire supply chain.
Data note: USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 primarily provides production estimates for 2025; the IEA adds analysis of processing and supply risks. Mining, refining and ownership shares are not interchangeable and should not be averaged into a single “dependency percentage”. Rare earths are treated here as one group containing several elements.